Commercial Loans - The NEW SubPrime

Stepping over line and into the realm of commercial lending can feel a little daunting at first - almost like stepping into the Wild West of the lending world. Trust me when I tell you that while there are differences, it's nothing that you'll need a six-shooter to overcome. Let's explore some of the reasons why a broker would want to step over this line and once having done so, what programs GMC has available and at the broker's disposal.

It doesn't take a rocket surgeon to figure out that the SubPrime lending segment is near extinct, if it's not there already. Prime, Alt-A, and even hard money deals are tougher to get done today than at any other point in the last 10 years or so. There was just an article today posted on Reuters showing how Countrywide's volume is down 48% this October as compared to last. Let's face it, the mortgage broker's job is only getting more difficult as time goes on and a little positive news would be a welcome change.

Commercial loans have long been the realm where only the most rugged brokers have tread and they've reaped the rewards for doing so. It's a sector that has immensely fewer regulations and doesn't know the meaning of the acronym RESPA. It's a place where the recent hits to residential values have taken less of a toll and a place where you can find positive light to shed on your business.

Property Types in the commercial world aren't quite as cookie-cutter as your residential SFRs, but they do have a vast advantage, they're typically income producing. The average property types are offices, warehouses, retail space, & multi-family (5+ units). These properties are all quite easy to put a tenant in and will therefore cash flow and literally pay for themselves. The DSCR (debt service coverage ratio [Wikipedia Info]) is a key acronym that you'll need to learn. It relates to the amount of net income a property generates as compared to what the debt on the property costs. Most lenders look to have a DSCR of 1.1 or greater, allowing for some cushion.

Loan Types also vary widely from your typical 30 yr fixed and ARM options. Loan structures can range from a 6-12 month balloon, to 30 year fixed loans and cover everything in between. It's important to talk to you borrowers and find out exactly what their goals are for their loan, as rates, fees, and prepayment penalties can vary widely depending on loan type.

Rates & Fees are typically inline with residential rates, with factors such as credit, property type and LTV vastly affecting pricing. Loans do have the ability to be priced as low as 6%+ with NO points up front, though prepays are typically mandatory on these loans.

You'll find that GMC offers several commercial programs that allow for all types of properties and borrowers to receive financing. A brief synopsis of these programs are expounded upon below. Our Loan Matrix also has a quick break-down and overview of these programs, as does our latest Commercial Flyer. Let's start with the cream-of-the-crop, and work our way through to our Hard Money programs.

Conventional.

• Property Types: Typically more cookie-cutter property types (Office, Warehouse, Retail, Multi-Family, Light Industrial, Apartments, Hotels).
• FICO Limits: 660+
• Rates: Better properties and borrowers, better rates - starting at 5.99%
• LTVs: Up to 80%
• Loan Amounts: $750k+
• General: This is the top-tier commercial program, great rates require clean borrowers and clean deals.

Small Balance.

• Property Types: All of the above, as well as Bed & Breakfasts, Auto Services, Day Cards, Restaurants, Marinas, and other income producing properties
• FICO Limits: 660+
• Rates: Starting around 8.5%
• LTVs: Up to 70-75%
• Loan Amounts: $250k - $3M
• General: Greater risk = poorer pricing. High LTVs, unique property types, lower FICOs, etc. will all result in higher rates & fees.

Hard Money.

• Property Types: All of the above, as well as land and anything else under the sun (@ the right LTV)
• FICO Limits:. None, this is hard money!
• LTVs: 65% Max
• Loan Amounts: $1M+
• General: Hard money is an expensive date, but could be cheaper than giving away equity and is great for borrowers who can't otherwise find a home for their loan.

As you can see we try to cater to most any scenario that you'd run across. The easiest and fastest way to start submitting your commercial deals is to submit your scenario via our online quick submission form. This is located at http://commercial.gmcmortgagecapital.com/ and should only take about 60 seconds to complete.

Our commercial desk will then get back to you if we're able to help out with the scenario. They will typically ask for the following, necessary documents:

• 1003 - Used for hard data about the deal, borrower, property, etc.
• Credit Report - Allows us to judge which program(s) the borrower(s) qualify for
• Executive Summary - Paint a picture of the deal, borrower, situation, scenario,
  anything we need to know
• Sources/Uses of Cash Document
• Refi - What are they doing with the cash-out
• Purchase -where's the cash coming from?
• Appraisal (if performed) - If not one, get digital pictures, MLS listing, drawings, anything to help paint the picture
• Purchase Contract (purchases only) - To judge terms, timelines, etc.

I think you'll find our Commercial Desk a pleasure to work with and we'd like to help you, your borrowers both in getting these deals funded. We'll be happy to do a little hand holding at the out set wherever and whenever necessary and appropriate. It might take a little bit to get truly comfortable in this sector, but the outcome can open numerous doors as we all work through these trying times.

Too Many Homes, Too Few Buyers

As touched on briefly in a previous post on valuations, one of the major factors overhanging our current real estate market is the sheer number of properties currently available for sale. This vast inventory of unsold homes blankets the nations and keeps our prospects of increasing values in the dark.

A recent news release from the National Association of Realtors notes that existing homes sales in September have fallen to their lowest levels since 9/11. The data shows that 5.04 million units changed hands in September 2007, down 19.1% from 6.23 million year-over-year. This decrease in sales of 1.2 million units, year-over-year, can lead to only one thing, increasing inventories.


This chart details the rise in inventories from January of 2001 through September of 2007. The clearly upward sloping trend has increased exponentially since the summer of 2005 and currently sits at around 4.5 million unsold units.


This represents a roughly 10.5 monthly supply of homes (see chart left), or an average marketing time of 315 days. At GMC we've been seeing more and more appraisals with the 'greater than 6 month' marketing time box checked, and trend that will surely continue. Looking at a 90 day sale price (~28% of the average time on market), one can clearly see that values will need to be reduced to accurately reflect the price expected to be received within this time frame.

Each of these charts goes to show that we're no longer living 24 months ago. The current market and housing economy are quite different than borrowers, brokers, and lenders are accustomed to seeing. We all need to realize the effects that years of surplus liquidity have had on our marketplace. As in any market that gets a little over-zealous there needs to come a correctional phase. This just happens to be the stage we're in now and, per current foreclosure predictions and other data, one that looks to continue.

Jumbos - Supersize my loan

Hard money, super jumbo - is it really true!?! The quick answer is YES, we can lend these kinds of dollar amounts. In fact, we've started to see quite a few of these $1,000,000+ deals over the course of the last few weeks alone.

The jumbo loan has always been a deal that we've been able to get done, though it does take a little more finesse and diligence to do so. Let's delve into the inner workings of these super-sized loans in order to get a better understanding of how a lender looks at these larger loan amounts.

To begin with, it's good to realize that our continued moniker of 'common sense' plays even more of a role on these jumbos. As always, our worst-case scenario is to foreclose on the property and these large deals only increase this concern. Monthly payments are $10k+ always for the borrowers, as are our carrying costs. Selling these homes is tougher in the current real estate market - especially in light of the credit crunch(felt even more so in non-conforming, jumbo paper). In order to mitigate the risk, and these increased carrying costs, LTVs are going to be limited to 50-60% on the vast majority of these larger loans.

Documentation of income/assets is a MUST on these loans. We absolutely will not be able to do a Stated/Stated deal of over $1M, and really over $750k or so. We always want the payment stream on these deals and not the property. We have to ensure that the borrower(s) has/have the income (provable, documentable income) to make the payments. We also have to better understand their current story, why their seeking hard money, and what true benefit is derived from the deal. If they're self-employed we need more info on their business - how long in business, what they're doing, why they're seeking an 11-12% rate on their mortgage.

The appraisal and the current home's actual value becomes more valuable at the onset. We'll take a look at the date performed, the sold date(s) of the comps, the condition of the property, etc. A quick Zillow.com report will show us the other homes in the neighborhood and if they're truly in the same ball-park as the subject property. If the appraisal's showing $3M and the neighborhood is all in the $1.5M range, it makes us think twice. We're typically able to get a pretty good sense of the home's rough value within 60-120 seconds by looking at each at the appraisal and a Zillow.com neighborhood overview. Realtor.com is another good source to take a look at for current listing prices of homes in the area.

One must realize that a LOT of these deals, especially with older appraisals, have been shopped to all corners of the country in an effort to get them done. Realize that there's typically a reason they haven't - they're not good deals. This may be a factor of the property not being able to support the given valuation, the borrower not being able to support the projected monthly payments, or a combination of both.

At the end of the day, these loans are under a much finer toothed comb and more focused magnifying glass than our average $250k loan amount. There's more reward involved, but juxtaposed against increased risk. We WANT to close these deals, but we only want to close the best of these deals and the ones that make sense from all angles. As these historical times continue in our sector, those left are continually more risk averse. The super-sized loan, by nature, carries more risk - we need to mitigate that risk with solid value and solid borrowers.

Timeline - Can we close yesterday ?!?

Ever heard of a loan closing in less than a week? We've done it. Submitted on Monday & closed on Friday. I'm not going to stand here and tell you that it's an easy thing to accomplish, but if all the stars align correctly, it is possible. Even though the majority of deals take longer that 7 days to close, know that lenders want to close a deal just a quickly as borrowers and brokers.

Let's unpack the loan processing / underwriting process and see where the potential pitfalls are and how proactive preparation will only speed a loan to closing.

TODAY- Our Account Executive (AE) gets a call to price out a deal. Within 2 minutes they'll have a PreApproval.pdf document emailed out, inclusive of all information necessary to get the deal submitted into our corporate office for processing.

TOMORROW- Our Account Manager (AM) is going to call and/or email the broker. They're going to be the ones collecting the following required documents:

• 1003 / 1008 - signed by borrower(s)


• GFE, TIL, Borrower's Authorization - signed by borrower(s)


• Credit Report - 30 days or less preferrably


• Appraisal - .PDF, color interior photos, <90>
  
• Signed Terms Letter


• Signed Letter of Net Tangible Benefit - handwritten


• .FNM digital copy of file

Once all of the docs are sent to the AM they'll put together the package and submit it to our corporate office for processing.

Day 1- Our Loan Setup Desk is going to review each file and look for the following items (links are to GMC blog entries pertaining to each subject):

• VALUE - 60-90 day sale price. Recent, Close Proximity, & Bona Fide comps. Property is in good condition, no bullet-proof vest needed to visit, no major repairs necessary.


• EMPLOYMENT - Verifiable employment, benchmarkable income. 50% max DTI


• NTB - True Benefit to the Borrower. Better off after we close the loan than before

Each deal is then color based on findings.

• GREEN - Everything looks good, we order the BPO, send Prior to Doc stips to broker


• YELLOW - Minor issue(s) to overcome. Borrower/Broker asked to pay for BPO (rebated @ closing), Prior to Doc stips sent to the broker.


• ORANGE - More serious issue(s) to overcome. Once issue(s) cleared, stips are sent. Borrower/Broker required to pay for the BPO


• RED - If the deal just doesn't work, a denial letter will be sent with the reason why

DAY 2-5 - We'll get the BPO back and send it to our end-investor for value confirmation. Final value / loan amount / terms will determined and the broker will be notified of these terms for acceptance thereof.

DAY 3-12 - All remaining stips are cleared and the file is sent to underwriting. Any remaining stips are sent to the broker

DAY 10-14 - Deal receives its final CTC, is doc'd out, closes, and funds after the recsission period is up (OO deals).

As you'll notice, there is a lot of wiggle-room in the above timelines and dates. The biggest time savers to get a deal closed quickly are:

• Deal PreScrub. Make sure value, employment, & net tangible benefit are all not going to be an issue.


• BPO Process. Ensure the borrower is aware of the BPO process and that someone will need to come inside to take a few pictures.


• Stip Submission. Be timely with submitting stips back into the office. Most of the delays come from this aspect and momentum is key with these deals.

Most importantly, be responsive. Our entire goal is to either KILL or CLOSE a deal as fast as possible. Understand that no one gets paid to work on a file that dies. We'll do our best to keep the broker updated throughout the process with exactly what we need.

Our focus in the back office is to turn the ORANGE deals to YELLOW and the YELLOW deals to GREEN - with the lion's share of our time spent working on closing the GREEN deals. Any help to make sure that deals fall into the GREEN category from the outset will only help get to get them closed quickly !!

Mortgage Lenders - Behind the Scenes

AN INSIGHT TO HOW LENDERS LEND AND THEIR RELIANCE ON OTHER LENDERS

The vast majority of mortgage brokers assume that when they are working with a mortgage bank that they have ample or unlimited funds and that all quality controls and decisions are made in-house. This article is designed to give brokers a behind the scenes look at how mortgage banks operate, why many of the mortgage banks have gone under, and the importance of portfolio capital.

The Warehouse Line- The Lender’s Lender

Just about every mortgage bank has a warehouse facility, which is their line of credit they use to make mortgage loans to the end borrowers. These warehouse lines are provided by all levels of banks and every bank borrowers from other banks (i.e. – Bear Stearns shut down two of their funds due to the termination of warehouse facilities from Merrill Lynch). The terms and requirements of these warehouse facilities vary widely depending on the loan product, borrower type, and credibility of the mortgage bank. Typically, the warehouse lender will lend the mortgage bank 98-100% of the loan amount being lent to the borrower. This means that even the very large mortgage banks are not required to have substantial capital in-house. For example, a mortgage bank that funds $1 Billion per month would in most cases not be required to have more than $20 Million of their own cash in the company. As all major mortgage banks package their loans and sell them on the secondary market through securitization, these loans are typically only held by the Company for only 30-90 days. The warehouse line allows the mortgage bank to leverage their capital many times over, allowing them to participate in advantageous market conditions. However, in poor market conditions, the caveat on the majority of warehouse lines is that they may be terminated at will by the warehouse bank at any time without notice. This has been the root cause in most of the mortgage banks having to close their doors (see: MLN, Option One, CBASS, American Home, and about 90 others). When the warehouse bank pulls the credit facility of the mortgage bank, this incapacitates the mortgage bank from closing and funding any loans, thereby making them a lame duck and forcing them to close their doors.

Per an earlier article written by Gregory Freedman in the August 2007 edition of the Scotsman Guide, I addressed the vast liquidity coming from Wall Street that was fueling most of the mortgage banks. The underlying concept is that as fast as the liquidity appeared, resulting in rampant growth and profitability of these mortgage banks, we are now learning that this liquidity can disappear even faster. This is bad news for the mortgage industry as a whole and unfortunately, this is going to continue to get worst before it gets better.

Securitzation- Wall Street's Exit Strategy

As mentioned above, all major mortgage banks aggregate their loans and sell them off in securitizations (bonds), which are sold to institutional investors throughout the world with European and Asian investors being the largest purchasers. The securitization marketplace has been booming over recent years and has been an inexpensive and profitable outlet for mortgage banks to continuously re-leverage their capital. The number of mortgage-backed securitizations has doubled since 2004, however, earlier this year the subprime securitizations that were previously sold began performing very poorly with record figures of delinquency. This, combined with real estate valuations dropping, struck an ominous chord which has reverberated throughout the markets. The concern is that billions and even trillions of dollars of such mortgages that have already been originated would not perform as expected, this would cause a ripple effect throughout the market.

Well, this is exactly what happened. Securitizations as a whole have not been performing as originally forecasted and the investor demand to purchase these securitizations has diminished substantially. This halt in securitzation results in a clog of assets sitting on warehouse lines that now have nowhere to go, hence the banks ceasing new fundings.

This has forced many mortgage banks (even some of the biggest), to completely cease all new mortgage origination. They are also being required to liquidate the loans they hold on the books and due to the lack of liquidity in the market, there are only a few bidders and the prices being paid for these loans are at very steep discounts.

It should take about 6-12 months to weed out which companies will remain in business and which will have to shut down, but I will make a forecast that the number of lenders to “implode” will increase two-fold over the next year.

Portfolio- Can you say liquidity?

There are very few lenders that do not utilize warehouse lines or participate in the securitization marketplace. For a long time, these portfolio lenders have been the big losers in the mortgage space by not taking advantage of cheap leverage capital from other banks. Now, however, these lenders may end up being the only ones with any liquidity to actually close and fund loans in the interim until this mess works itself out.

Most portfolio lenders operate as a fund or partnership whereby their investment capital is committed for an extended period of time. Portfolio lenders may also have warehouse lines, however, these warehouse lines are typically also committed in a matching duration of the investment capital. This secures the portfolio lender ongoing capital, regardless of market conditions.

As portfolio lenders are seeking higher returns than the prime mortgage market, they are typically geared more towards the true sub-prime and hard money space. These portfolio lenders may end up being the only outlet for the low-fico and low-LTV loans on a go-forward basic.

Too many lenders who have relied solely upon the trickle down demand from foreign investors, that flowed through Wall Street and their warehouse lines, are now facing the unavoidable reality that the liquidity well has run dry - at least for the time being. Batten down the hatches and find yourself a good portfolio lender, this storm's going to be here for a while...

Determining value in today's uncertain market

Countless times we are asked: Do you cut appraisals? Do you slash values? Are you going to kill the value on my deal? No. No. and No. But you're a lender, of COURSE you're going to say that... comes the response.

Take a moment, put down your pre-conceived biases and take a quick view from the lender's perspective on this issue. I assure you it'll give a much clearer picture of why we do what we do.

Being a hard money lender, we lend dollars to borrowers who typically don't have the cleanest of credit reports and best track record of making payments on time. We bail out borrowers from the midst of a BK or mere days before their home goes on the foreclosure auction block. Even though our ultimate goal on every deal is to give a borrower a fresh, clean start and get them on the right track to turning their financial fortunes around - this route is never guaranteed. We always have to keep the thought in the back of our minds that the borrower may fall back into their old ways and we may have to foreclose on the property.

Let's consider some key points here about selling a home: Carrying Costs, Sale Time, Market Strength (both supply side and demand side).

Carrying Costs. It takes at minimum 60 days to even start foreclosure proceedings, and then on average 4-6 months to actually complete. That's 6-8 months of carrying costs before any $$'s are recouped, a significant chunk of change (especially at 11%-12% rates). It also opens us up to the question - where are values going to be in 6-8 months when it comes time to actually sell this property?

Sale Time. When the lender takes the property back and sells it on the open market there's a trade-off between marketing time and price received. If we put a fire-sale list price on the property, we're going to get far less for it, but if list it unrealistically high and end up holding the property, hoping for higher $$'s, we are increase our above mentioned carrying costs. Our end goal is to sell the property in 90 days, this seems to be a fair trade-off to maximize sales price and minimize carrying costs.

Market Strength. Let's quickly consider the current state of the real estate market in 95% of the country. We'll do this by analyzing both the supply and demand side of the market.

Looking at supply side analysis - more borrowers are defaulting on their mortgages and having their homes go into foreclosure. More investors, some in at first for the easy flip, are getting burned and are now putting up their investment properties for sale, at far lower prices than they ever imagined. More builders are having tougher times selling their properties and offering lower prices and greater incentives to move inventory. Add it up and your have more homes for sale now than in the past several years. See WSJ.com article or click image for ineractive chart.

A quick demand side review shows far from a Monet-like picture. MortgageImplode.com shows 161 (as of this writing) lenders that are currently out of the business. The subprime sector as we have known it is all but a recent memory. The Alt-A sector is vastly smaller than it once was. Securitization, the once raging under-current in our loan cycle, has slowed to a trickle is all but the uber-clean A-Paper segments of the industry. All this equates to borrowers who used to qualify, no questions asked, for 100% financing (at loan amounts 5% higher than asking prices [to included enough of a seller-concession to cover closing costs] I might add) being denied financing left and right. Alt-A borrower are being given rates in the double digits, and even A-Paper borrowers are being scrutinized more-so than in months past.

Being based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, we've seen property prices slashed drastically across the board. Sure we saw meteoric rises of 20-30% annually for the past years, but this only gives us more room to fall. We're discounting 1% per month for comps used that have sold within the last year, and this might be too conservative an number to use even still.

Each of the above factors is enough to make any investors nervous about lending money on the street right now given softening collateral values. Add in the fact that our borrowers are a safer bet not to make the monthly payment, we need to exercise caution.

Our entire value analysis, metrics, and practices are based on trying to find an accurate depiction of what we could sell any given property for if we wanted it on the market no more than 90 days. We try to take a conservative, yet at the end of the day realistic approach to valuation.

Don't send an appraisal with 2006 comps. Don't send an appraisal with comps greater than a mile away in populated areas. Don't send far-superior comps in to try to boost your properties value. A quick Zillow.com search will, more often than not, turn up a half-a-dozen realistic, recently sold, close, valid, and bona-fide comps to use to value your property.

At the end of the day, we get paid to close loans. We don't get paid to work on the loans that don't close, for whatever reason, value included. We also won't be able to make loans if we're doing so using values that are going to put us in jeopardy of losing $$'s if/when we have to take back and sell the property.

Ask yourself - if this was your money, the borrower has a 465 credit score, is 6*120 and currently in Foreclosure, the property is a condo in Miami, and you're handed an appraisal with October 2006 comps - would you lend 65% of that appraised value?

Finding the Benefit in Net Tangible Benefit

For a number of years the broker was top of the mortgage world totem pole. This penultimate position allowed some brokers the ability to inform the appraiser how much the subject property was worth and to tell the borrower(s) how much money they earned each year. Small fibs grew to stretching the truth, which morphed into white lies, that finally parlayed themselves into outright fraud.

While the majority of brokers out there stayed away from this daisy-chain to disaster, the allure of 3+ points on the back of an option-ARM was too much for many to pass up. Lender's underwriting guidelines had lapsed into quick once-overs of the file and the, as already written, insatiable Wall Street demand kept the spigots open and fundings flowing. As the spreads, and therefore profits, on loans became larger and larger, it became easier and easier to turn a blind eye to what was happening.

Value became detached from reality and merely a number that was dictated by which program paid the most YSP to the broker. The appraisal process turned into an equation of: VALUE = (CashOut + Closing Costs + Payoffs) / Max Program LTV.

The income side of the equation wasn't too far off from the above. Taking program's a max DTI allowed, subtracting a few points for a margin of error and then backing into what the borrower needed to be making to qualify. These SISA loans didn't become known as 'Liar Loans' for unmerited reasons.

As was bound to happen, these bad apple loans have begun to rot in the securities into which they were bundled. Many of these notes have begun to go bad and the borrowers are being sent default notices rates far surpassing historical averages. Remembering that home-ownership is the 'American Dream' and that foreclosing on that dream is never a pretty picture, things have started to get ugly. Homeowners have begun to fight tooth and nail to keep the roof over their heads, lawmakers have started to devise bass-ackwards plans to save these over-indebted individuals and families, and most importantly, the vulturous lawyers have begun to circle overhead.

The unpleasant odor of impropriety and fraud has created a breeding ground for lawsuits and a much ballyhooed rallying cry of 'save the American Dream'. Much has been written about the misdoings and legal rumblings that have already started. Read the Counting the Subprime Lender Lawsuits blog here, or any other of the myriad of articles that a Google search will produce.

The question now becomes, what to do about all of this. Aside from the points described in the previous post, we here at GMC, for some time now, have been using a Net Tangible Benefits Form. This form is devised for the sole purpose of flushing out the true purpose of the loan to each of our borrowers. It's used to paint us a picture and common sense outline of why the deal makes sense, and why, at the end of the day the borrower is better off for having us originate the loan. We want to ensure that their truly is a benefit, save for lining the broker's and our own pocket books. Reducing a borrower's current rate, saving a home from foreclosure, using equity to buyout an existing bankruptcy, taking cashout to reduce overall monthly debt obligations - these are just some of the benefits we're able to offer to our borrowers and some of the benefits we double check to make sure exist on every deal.

This NTB form goes hand-in-hand with our employment verification, as one is near meaningless without the other. It's great to save a home from going into foreclosure, but not great if that borrower is then unable to afford their new payment.

We want to make sure the borrower is better off after signing on the dotted line. We want to ensure that we protect all parties in the transaction. We want to make sure that we're here going forward and that we're putting our customers, brokers and the end borrowers alike into a better situation then before they came to us. After all, who wants to be sued anyhow?

Press Release

GMC Hard Money Announces it will portfolio all hard money assets

GMC Hard Money is satisfied to announce that it has completed negotiations with two large investment portfolios to accept 100% of the hard money origination of GMC. GMC began discussions to portfolio its hard money loan business back in January of this year in light of forecasting the eminent turbulence that would occur within the secondary and securitization markets due to the sub-prime debacle.

This move secures GMC Hard Money with ample capital and autonomy to gain market share in the hard money space while the majority of its competitors rely on the secondary market, which has proven to be unreliable at best in the past several months.

With the lack of liquidity on Wall Street for newly originated mortgage product, GMC Hard Money feels that this move was essential and necessary in order to preserve its broker relationships and maintain its service levels and loan pricing.

Many hard money lenders have been forced out of business or had to drastically reduce staff and infrastructure, thereby decreasing service levels. Having the ability to keep these loans on the books means that GMC Hard Money remains one of few hard money lenders that can actually close and fund loans with no reliance on the movements of the rest of the mortgage marketplace.

GMC Hard Money has added many additional sales staff, some of which has come over from former competitors in the hard money space, to provide our broker clients the service and execution they deserve.

GMC Hard Money lends in approximately two dozen key states with LTV’s up to 70% in certain areas of the country. To discuss a loan scenario or to just find out more about GMC Hard Money, please visit our website at http://www.gmchardmoney.com/ or just give us a call at (954) 332-3567.

Historical Times

Unless you're an ostrich with your head in the sand, you realize the historical times that are currently upon us. The mortgage market as a whole has been turned on its head by a tidal wave of surplus Wall Street liquidity that has near instantaneously evaporated. MortgageImplode.com is fast approaching a dozen dozen lenders who have vanished. More will continue to follow suit and the ones left standing will reap the benefits.

GMC Hard Money looks to be one of those lenders who realized the race was always a marathon and not a sprint. We have avoided drinking the greed laced Kool-Aid that so many other lenders have in search of the quick buck and fast cash.

The 'common sense' philophies of originating loans has started to pay its dues and looks only to continue to do so. Our ability to leverage our portfolio investors' appetite for these deals, along with our ability to find the deals and package them correctly is going to go a long way. Firms selling to institutional, Wall Street firms that have the end goal of securitization are feeling the tightening noose currently, if they already haven't had the stool pulled from under them.

Let the others ride the short-term, sugar induced temporary highs - we'll continue to stick with our 'common sense' and 'Underwriting 101' guidelines that have kept us in business to date.